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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 
STEVEN ALAN SAMSON* 
 
Abstract 
The early nineteenth century in America was a period in which 
the idea of religious liberty came to be worked out in practice in 
a setting of growing diversity.  The immediate effect of the 
dissolution of state religious establishments was to strengthen 
the vitality and prestige of the churches themselves.  Before the 
end of the century, the church historian Philip Schaff could 
regard as normal ‘a free church in a free state, or a self-
supporting and self-governing Christianity in independent but 
friendly relation to the civil government.’ 
I INTRODUCTION 
The representation of the Constitution of the United States as ‘the supreme 
law of the land’, which echoes the phrase ‘law of the land’ in the Magna 
Carta, refers to more than the document itself.1  It is unnecessary to 
speculate about the exact intent of the founders when the very language of 
the Constitution attests to its continuity with and even incorporation of 
common law or higher law concepts.  Indeed, this understanding was 
                                         
* BA, MA, PhD. Professor of Government, Helms School of Government, Liberty 
University, Lynchburg, Virginia. 
1 This article is largely drawn from the fifth and sixth chapters, “The American 
Commonwealth” and “Early Constitutional Issues,” of the author’s doctoral 
dissertation.  Steven Alan Samson, Crossed Swords: Entanglements Between 
Church and State in America. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1984. 
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affirmed by the founders themselves and has been periodically reaffirmed 
by members of the judiciary.2  As Edward S. Corwin contended: 
The attribution of supremacy to the Constitution on the ground solely of its 
rootage in popular will represents, however, a comparatively late outgrowth 
of American constitutional theory.  Earlier the supremacy accorded to 
constitutions was ascribed less to their putative source than to their 
supposed content, to their embodiment of an essential and unchanging 
justice. ... There are, it is predicated, certain principles of right and justice 
which are entitled to prevail of their own intrinsic excellence, all together 
regardless of the attitude of those who wield the physical resources of the 
community.3 
The principles of higher law jurisprudence may be traced to the earliest 
period of modern western law.  In the twelfth century, for example, Gratian 
                                         
2 Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional 
Law (Cornell University Press, 1955) 89.  See R. Kemp Morton, God in the 
Constitution (Cokesbury Press, 1933) 110116.  See also H. E. Bradford, ‘And 
God Defend the Right: The American Revolution and the Limits of Christian 
Obedience’ (1983) Christianity and Civilization 239: "According to the Old Whig 
view of the English Constitution, it was not a contract but a source of identity—
with no author but the nation and its history, with God an implicit party to the 
process.  As covenant qua law it grew out of the interaction of people and princes 
living out of the nation's genius, with God's blessing its confirmation.  These 
assumptions undergird most of the early American political documents."  Henry 
Steele Commager, ‘Constitutional History and the Higher Law’ in Conyers Read 
(ed), The Constitution Reconsidered (Harper Torchbooks, revised ed, 1968) 225–
226, cited several affirmations of this sort as expressions of an early higher law 
tradition in early American jurisprudence.  While Commager, who wrote this 
essay in 1938, claimed that the tradition's underlying philosophy had been 
repudiated three-quarters of a century earlier, he did acknowledge its importance 
in constitutional history: ‘Americans, having discovered the usefulness of natural 
law, elaborated it, and having justified its application by success, protected that 
success by transforming natural into constitutional law: the state and federal 
constitutions. And in so far as natural law had found refuge in written law, there 
was little reason to invoke it; it was automatically invoked whenever the 
constitution was invoked, and this was the logic of t1arshall in the Marbury case.’  
Ibid 228. 
3 Ibid 4. 
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wrote: ‘Enactments (constitutiones), whether ecclesiastical or secular, if 
they are proved to be contrary to natural law, must be totally excluded.’4 
The new federal union was, in effect, given the authority to coordinate the 
political system but not to dominate it.  Its overall success assumes the 
continued good health of the various social institutions, such as families 
and churches, that also exercise powers of a governmental nature.  The 
safeguards built into the constitutional system ultimately depend on the 
consensus and self-restraint of its component parts.  This is a key to 
properly understanding the relationship between church and state as it was 
originally envisioned.  As James Madison remarked during the ratification 
debates in Virginia: "There is not a shadow of a right in the general 
government to intermeddle with religion.  Its least interference with it 
would be a most flagrant usurpation."5 
Like the Declaration, the Constitution is based on the premise that the 
primary purpose of civil government is essentially negative rather than 
positive: that is, protective, prohibitory, and punitive.  Since its power is 
coercive by nature rather than simply persuasive, the founders believed that 
civil authority must be constitutionally restrained.  James Madison declared 
that an accumulation of powers in the same hands "may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."6  Alexander Hamilton similarly 
urged that the original grant of powers to Congress was a limited one: 
                                         
4 Harold J. Berman, ‘The Origins of Western Legal Science’ (1977) 90 Harvard 
Law Review 925. 
5 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of 
the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at 
Philadelphia in 1787 (J. B. Lippincott & Co., 2nd ed, 1863) vol 1, p. 330. 
6 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist: A 
Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, ed. Edward Mead Earle 
(New York: Modern Library) 313. Quoting Federalist, no. 47. See also Abraham 
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The plan of the convention declares that the power of Congress, or, in other 
words, of the national legislature, shall extend to certain enumerated cases. 
This specification of particulars evidently excludes all pretension to a 
general legislative authority, because an affirmative grant of special powers 
would absurd, as well as useless, if a general authority was intended.7 
Likewise, in his Farewell Address, George Washington cautioned against 
the tendency of governments to usurp power: 
If, in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification of the 
Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an 
amendment in the way which the constitution designates. —But let there be 
no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the 
instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments 
are destroyed.—The precedent must always greatly overbalance in 
permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time 
yield.— Of all the dispositions and habits, which lead to political prosperity, 
Religion, and Morality are indispensable supports.—In vain would that man 
claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great 
pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of Men and 
Citizens.8  
But this warning has been largely ignored because the focus of American 
politics is more generally on the means rather than on commonly conceded 
ends.  Chief Justice John Marshall helped set the stage—and the tone—for 
many subsequent controversies by adopting a sweeping view of proper 
constitutional means in McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 421 (1819): 
                                                                                                                        
Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1978) 
9699, on the practical implications of sphere sovereignty. 
7  Ibid 541, quoting Federalist, no. 83. 
8 Charles W Eliot (ed), The Harvard Classics: American Historical Documents 
1000-1904 (Collier & Son, 1910) vol 3, 260. 
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Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and 
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional. 
One of the great challenges to constitutional liberty has come through a 
gradual shift of emphasis from prohibition to regulation, from a protective 
to a beneficent or philanthropic conception of civil power.9  What Alexis de 
Tocqueville subsequently wrote about the regulation of manufacturing 
associations might be applied with equal validity to the regulation of 
religious activity: 
If once the sovereign had a general right of authorizing associations of all 
kinds upon certain conditions, he would not be long without claiming the 
right of superintending and managing them, in order to prevent them from 
departing from the rules laid down by himself.  In this manner the state, 
after having reduced all who are desirous of forming associations into 
dependence, would proceed to reduce into the same condition all who 
belong to associations already formed; that is to say, almost all the men who 
are now in existence.10 
                                         
9 See Frederick Bastiat, The Law (Dean Russell trans, The Foundation for 
Economic Education, Inc., 1950) 21–29; H L Richardson, What Makes You Think 
We Read the Bills? (Caroline House Books, 1978) 79–89; T. Robert Ingram, The 
Two Powers (St Thomas Press, 1959) 15. 
10 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Henry Reeve trans, Phillips 
Bradley (ed), Vintage Books, 1945) vol 2, 33031.  Walter Lippmann regarded it 
as ‘an extraordinary paradox’ that the intellectual leaders of the 1930's believed 
such detailed regulation to be necessary.  As an illustration, he cited Lewis 
Mumford: "As industry advances in mechanization, a greater weight of political 
authority must develop outside than was necessary in the past.”  Lewis Mumford, 
Technics and Civilization (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1934; Harbinger, 1963) 420. 
Regarding this kind of other-directedness, Lippmann commented: "Is it not truly 
extraordinary that in the latest phase of the machine technic we are advised that 
we must return to the political technic—that is, to the sumptuary laws and the 
forced labour which were the universal practice in the earlier phases of the 
machine technic?  I realise that Mr Mumford hopes and believes that the 
omnipotent sovereign power will now be as rational in its purposes and its 
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The success of the struggle for political liberty was soon followed by a 
growth of religious liberty and the collapse of denominational 
establishments.  For a time, centralizing tendencies were held in check. 
II THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN REPUBLIC 
The idea of religious liberty is best understood in the context of a 
prolonged practical experiment.  Many of the colonies, particularly 
Plymouth Plantation (1620), Massachusetts Bay (1630), Maryland (1634), 
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (1636), Connecticut (1636), New 
Haven (1640), and Pennsylvania (1681), were settled by religious 
dissenters who wished to be free to practice their faith unmolested.  
Religious liberty was born in the crucible of conflicting European religious 
practices which spilled over into a distant land.  Denominational traditions 
were put to the test under frontier conditions characterized by slow 
communication, fluid migration, and the intermingling and fusion of 
various religious and political ideas.  As Alexis de Tocqueville later 
observed of the result: “Religion in America takes no direct part in the 
government of society, but it must be regarded as the first of their political 
institutions; for if it does not impart a taste for freedom, it facilitates the use 
of it. ...”11 
A century after the Constitution was ratified, church historian Philip Schaff 
reviewed the development of religious liberty in America and detected a 
close connection between the American political and religious consensus. 
                                                                                                                        
measures as are the physicists and chemists who have invented alloys and 
harnessed electricity.  But the fact remains that he believes the beneficent promise 
of modern science can be realized only through the political technology of the 
pre-scientific ages."  Walter Lippmann, The Good Society (Grosset & Dunlop, 
1936) 89. 
11 Ibid vol 1, 316. 
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If we speak of a Christian nation we must take the word in the qualified 
sense of the prevailing religious sentiment and profession; for in any nation 
and under any relation of church and state, there are multitudes of 
unbelievers, misbelievers, and hypocrites. ... With this understanding, we 
may boldly assert that the American nation is as religious and as Christian 
as any nation on earth, and in some respects even more so, for the very 
reason that the profession and support of religion are left entirely free.  
State-churchism is apt to breed hypocrisy and infidelity, while free-
churchism favors the growth of religion.12 
Schaff regarded as distinctively American the easy cooperation between 
religious and civil institutions, characterized by "a free church in a free 
state, or a self-supporting and self-governing Christianity in independent 
but friendly relation to the civil government."13  He concluded that the 
American system of law could not have originated from any other religious 
soil, adding that "we may say that our laws are all the more Christian 
because they protect the Jew and the infidel, as well as the Christian of 
whatever creed, in the enjoyment of the common rights of men and 
citizens.”14 
 
The nature of the difference between the state church and free church 
viewpoints may be seen in the different versions of the Westminster 
Confession of Faith, the most influential of Protestant doctrinal statements 
used in America.  Originally, the twenty-third chapter of the Confession—
entitled "Of the Civil Magistrate"—reflected the "national church" concept 
accepted in England and Scotland, where—even in 1647—it was somewhat 
                                         
12 Philip Schaff, ‘Church and State in the United States: or The American Idea of 
Religious Liberty and Its Practical Effects’ in Papers of the American Historical 
Association (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1888) vol 2, no 4, 5455. 
13 Ibid 9. 
14 Ibid 62. 
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at variance with the congregational establishments of New England.  The 
third section of the original chapter reads: 
The civil magistrate may not assume to himself the administration of the 
word and sacraments, or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven: 
yet he hath authority, and it is his duty, to take order, that unity and peace be 
preserved in the church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all 
blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in 
worship and discipline prevented or reformed, and all the ordinances of God 
duly settled, administered, and observed. For the better effecting whereof, 
he hath power to call synods, to be present at them, and to provide that 
whatsoever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God.15 
Despite a marked break with the pure Erastian view that the church is 
subject to the state, the assumption of a national establishment that 
underlay the Confession did not square with either the decentralized 
establishments of seventeenth century New England or the later voluntary 
church concept.16  As early as 1729, the Presbyterian synod of Philadelphia 
adopted the Westminster standards with modifications.  The wording in 
three of the chapters was formally changed in 1788.  The commonly 
accepted American revision of chapter 23, section three, reflects a 
conception of religious liberty which strongly resembles that of the First 
Amendment, even though it predated the Amendment by a year: 
Civil magistrates may not assume to themselves the administration of the 
word and sacraments; or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven; 
                                         
15 Ibid 50. 
16 An attempt by Robert Child and others to petition Parliament to support a 
Presbyterian establishment in New England and appoint a governor-general was 
successfully averted in 1647 by the General Court. John Fiske, The Beginnings of 
New England, or the Puritan Theocracy in Its Relations to Civil and Religious 
Liberty (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1930) 18891; Samuel Eliot Morison, 
Builders of the Bay Colony (Houghton Mifflin Company, revised ed, 1958) 244-
68. 
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or, in the least, interfere in matters of faith.  Yet, as nursing fathers, it is the 
duty of civil magistrates to protect the church of our common Lord, without 
giving the preference to any denomination of Christians above the rest, in 
such a manner that all ecclesiastical persons whatever shall enjoy the full, 
free, and unquestioned liberty of discharging every part of their sacred 
functions, without violence or danger. And, as Jesus Christ hath appointed a 
regular government and discipline in his church, no law of any 
commonwealth should interfere with, let, or hinder, the due exercise thereof, 
among the voluntary members of any denomination of Christians, according 
to their own profession and belief.  It is the duty of civil magistrates to 
protect the person and good name of all their people, in such an effectual 
manner as that no person be suffered, either upon pretense of religion or 
infidelity, to offer any indignity, violence, abuse, or injury to any other 
person whatsoever: and to take order, that all religious and ecclesiastical 
assemblies be held without molestation or disturbance.17 
But the problems of jurisdiction and sovereignty are not suddenly resolved 
by the simple expedient of substituting a "neutral state'' for a "confessional 
state."18  In fact, this concept of neutrality or disinterestedness has--by its 
lack of definition--introduced a genuine ambiguity into the relationship 
between church and state that very likely encouraged not only the 
proliferation of antagonistic sects but also the creation of public agencies 
that have duplicated—and sometimes replaced—various church ministries. 
For the most part, the Christian character of the social order was taken for 
granted.  But it may not have been simply the blithe indifference of 
churches to the hazards of Erastianism that led them to support a greater 
role by the state in public education and welfare.  Robert Handy explains 
                                         
17 Schaff, above n 12, 50.  For an example of the new attitude, see Gardiner Spring, 
Obligations of the World to the Bible: A Series of Lectures to Young Men (Taylor 
& Dodd, 1839) 14549. 
18 The terms "neutrality of the state" and "state confessionalism" are used in E. R. 
Norman, The Conscience of the State in North America (University Press, 1968). 
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that "the overtones of religious establishment implicit in much of what they 
did then was not clear to them, because as they developed new ways they 
did not realize how much of the old patterns they carried over the wall of 
separation into their new vision of Christian civilization."19  Well into the 
twentieth century, historian Edward Humphrey could still write: 
The American conception allows for national characteristics that are 
independent of the state.  So we are a Christian nation even though 
Christianity is not a feature of the American state.  The adoption of the 
American concept of the limited state resulted in the ideal of a free church in 
a free nation, the present American ideal of religious freedom.  As a 
corollary to this we have the ideal of a state freed from ecclesiastical 
control.20 
These words echo the sentiments of earlier and even later commentators, 
including judges and legal scholars like James Kent, Joseph Story, Thomas 
Cooley, David Brewer, and William O. Douglas.21  Yet the general respect 
                                         
19 Robert T. Handy, A Christian America: Protestant Hopes and Historical Realities 
(Oxford University Press, 1971) 40. 
20 Edward Frank Humphrey, Nationalism and Religion in America, 1774-1789 
(Chipman Law Publishing Company, 1924) 2. 
21 See James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, ed. 0. W. Holmes, Jr. (Little, 
Brown, and Company, 12 ed, 1873) vol 2, 3435 (45); Joseph Story, Commentaries 
on the Constitution of the United States; With a Preliminary Review of the 
Constitutional History of the Colonies and States, Before the Adoption of the 
Constitution (Hilliard, Gray, and Company, 1833; reprinted Da Capo Press, 1970) 
vol. 3, 72627; Thomas M. Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law 
in the United States of America, ed. Andrew C. McLaughlin, (Little, Brown, and 
Company, 3rd ed, 1898) 22425.  The definitive judicial statement regarding the 
Christian character of the American constitutional system is probably the lengthy 
obiter dictum by Justice David Brewer in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United 
States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).  Justice William O. Douglas appears to have made 
special reference to the long series of polygamy cases, particularly Davis v. 
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), when he wrote: “a ‘religious’ rite which violates 
standards of Christian ethics and morality is not in the true sense, in the 
constitutional sense, included within ‘religion,’ the ‘free exercise’ of which is 
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.”  William O. Douglas, An Almanac of Liberty 
(Doubleday and Company, 1954) 304. 
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for Christianity did little to prevent the now commonly accepted 
compartmentalization of spiritual and temporal concerns.  The divorce of 
religion from practical life appears to be the result of a dualistic attitude 
that regards the state as "worldly" and the church as "otherworldly," 
diminishing the reputation of both.  In this, it resembles the tendency of 
innumerable church heresies throughout history.22  Thus religion as a 
private concern of individuals is separated from politics as the public 
concern of communities.23 
The struggle for religious liberty during the last half of the eighteenth 
century succeeded in discrediting any remaining pretense that the kingdom 
of God could be established through coercion rather than conversion.  John 
Locke's view that a church "is a free and voluntary Society" soon 
prevailed.24  But with public opinion divided on the nature and extent of 
this new religious liberty, any consideration of the positive responsibilities 
of the state with respect to religion was obliged to take a back seat to the 
fight for disestablishment.  As a result, important issues were not fully 
addressed.  If, according to the Westminster standards, civil magistrates are 
                                         
22 Some of the antecedents of this dualism are examined in a chapter entitled "The 
Socialism of the Heresies" in Igor Shafarevich, The Socialist Phenomenon 
(William Tjalsma trans, Harper-Row, 1980) 1879.  
23 See Richard E. Morgan, The Politics of Religious Conflict: Church and State in 
America (Pegasus, 1968) 22, who quoted Roger Williams to the effect that the 
church should be regarded as just another private association: "… [L]ike unto a 
Body or College of Physicians in a City; like unto a Corporation, Society or 
Company of East-Indie or Turkie-Merchants, or any other Society or Company in 
London; Which Companies may hold their Courts, keep their Records; hold 
disputations; and in matters concerning their Society, may dissent, divide, break 
into Schisms and Factions, sue and implead each other at the Law, yea, wholly 
break up into pieces and nothing." 
24 Verna M. Hall, The Christian History of the Constitution of the United States of 
America: Self-Government with Union. American Revolution Bicentennial 
Edition, ed. Joseph Allan Montgomery (Foundation for American Christian 
Education, 1979) 48, quoting Locke's "A Letter Concerning Toleration." 
Samson, Religious Liberty in the Early American Republic 38 
to be regarded as "nursing fathers" (Isa. 49:22-23), in what way are they 
obliged to promote the welfare of the church?  In what sense is the 
magistrate "the minister of God" (Rom. 13:4)?  Who is responsible to set 
and uphold the moral standards of the community?  Even if the prophetic 
calling of the church to proclaim the word of God or the ministerial calling 
of the magistrate to enforce it were not at issue, some manner of 
involvement by civil officers in religious affairs and by church leaders in 
civil affairs would be unavoidable. The church does not operate in a 
political vacuum.  Neither does the state operate in a religious vacuum.  
Indeed, it is a basic premise of Christianity—despite periodic neglect of 
this principle—that both church and state are ministries under the direct 
authority of God and must govern their affairs within the framework of 
God's revealed word, the Bible. The practical issue is, as it always has 
been, to harmonize their respective activities. 
III LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 
The historical norm in the relationship between church and state is some 
kind of union or accommodation.  The concept of a strict separation may be 
no older than the country that first gave it substance.  But its origin is 
religious rather than secular.  The religious dissident, Roger Williams, 
coined the phrase "wall of separation" long before Thomas Jefferson 
penned his famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association or Justice 
Hugo Black equated it with the First Amendment guarantees.  In a letter to 
John Cotton written in 1644, several years after Williams had been 
banished from Massachusetts, he criticized the establishment concept, 
citing as proof against it 
… [T]he faithful labors of many witnesses of Jesus Christ, extant to the 
world, abundantly proving that the church of the Jews under the Old 
The Western Australian Jurist, vol 3, 2012 39 
Testament in the type, and the church of the Christians under the New 
Testament in the antitype, were both separate from the World; and that 
when they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation between the 
garden of the church and the wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke 
down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, and made His garden a 
wilderness, as at this day.  And that therefore if He will ever please to 
restore His garden and paradise again, it must of necessity be walled in 
peculiarly unto Himself from the world; and that all that shall be saved out 
of the world are to be transplanted out of the wilderness of the world, and 
added unto his church or garden.25 
The image of a wall of separation (Ezek. 42:20) is comparable to the motif 
of a hedge protecting the church from the wilderness (Ps. 80:12; Isa. 5:1-9; 
Ezek. 22:30), which was common to Puritan thought.  The difference is that 
Williams believed a strict separation was necessary to preserve the purity 
of the church, while Cotton—probably with the example of Nehemiah in 
mind—believed that the erection and maintenance of the wall was the work 
of the Christian magistrate.  For the leaders of Bay Colony, church and 
state were properly enclosed within the wall rather than separated by it.26 
This disagreement involved—and continues to involve—a basic difference 
of theology.  A century later, Isaac Backus, a Baptist leader who fought the 
church establishment of Massachusetts during the War for Independence, 
endorsed Williams as a herald of religious liberty and portrayed him as a 
victim of religious persecution. Although this view prevails in the standard 
                                         
25 Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government 
in American Constitutional History (The University of Chicago Press, 1965) 56, 
quoting Perry Miller, Roger Williams: His Contribution to the American Tradition 
(Atheneum, 1966) 98. 
26 Peter N. Carroll, Puritanism and the Wilderness: The Intellectual Significance of 
the New England Frontier, 1629-1700 (Columbia University Press, 1969) 8790, 
10914. The ''wall” is variously used as a metaphor for the Christian magistrate or 
the state itself. 
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histories, it appears to be based on a doubtful correlation of this incident 
and the "Antinomian controversy."  Indeed, Williams himself denied that 
religious persecution was a factor in his banishment.27 
It is Thomas Jefferson's use of the phrase "wall of separation," however, 
that has received the most attention.  In his 1802 letter to the Baptists of 
Danbury, Connecticut, President Jefferson wrote: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man 
and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, 
that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not 
opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole 
American people which declared that their legislature should "make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.28 
Edward S. Corwin's comment on the phrase and its use by Justice Black in 
Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1 (1947), sheds some light on the 
political considerations—Jefferson's as well as the Court's—that have 
affected its interpretation. 
The eager crusaders on the Court make too much of Jefferson's Danbury 
letter, which was not improbably motivated by an impish desire to heave a 
                                         
27 Regarding the banishment of Roger Williams, Henry Martyn Dexter, the foremost 
nineteenth century Congregationalist historian, wrote that “the weight of the 
evidence is conclusive to the point that this exclusion from the colony took place 
for reasons purely political, and having no relation to his notions upon toleration, 
or upon any subject other than those, which, in their bearing upon the common 
rights of property, upon the sanctions of the Oath, and upon due subordination to 
the powers that be in the State, made him a subverter of the very foundations of 
their government, and—with all his worthiness of character, and general 
soundness of doctrine—a nuisance which it seemed they had no alternative but to 
abate, in some way safe to them, and kindest to him!”  Henry Martyn Dexter, As 
To Roger Williams, and His 'Banishment' from the Massachusetts Plantation 
(Congregational Publishing Society, 1876) 7980. 
28 Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Basic Documents Relating 
to the Religious Clauses of the First Amendment (Americans United, 1965) 19. 
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brick at the Congregationalist-Federalist hierarchy of Connecticut, whose 
leading members had denounced him two years before as an "infidel" and 
"atheist."  A more deliberate, more carefully considered evaluation by 
Jefferson of the religion clauses of the First Amendment is that which 
occurs in his Second Inaugural: "In matters of religion, I have considered 
that its free exercise is placed by the constitution independent of the powers 
of the general government."  In short, the principal importance of the 
amendment lay in the separation which it effected between the respective 
jurisdictions of state and nation regarding religion, rather than in its bearing 
on the question of the separation of church and state.29 
It is ironic that this letter is taken as an expression of the intent of the 
framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.  At the time of the 
Constitutional Convention and the first session of Congress, Jefferson was 
serving as minister to France. He returned only after the Bill of Rights had 
been sent to the states for ratification late in 1789.  Instead, it was James 
Madison who drafted the amendments and successfully steered them 
through Congress, even though he did so with some reluctance because he 
believed "the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the 
federal powers are granted.30  While Madison conceded that a "properly 
executed" bill of rights might guard against ambitious rulers, he warned 
that 
… [T]here is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the 
most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude.  I am 
sure that the rights of conscience in particular, if submitted to public 
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definition would be narrowed much more than they are likely ever to be by 
an assumed power.31 
Madison’s reservations about specifying these rights found practical 
expression in the provisions against a narrow construction of these rights in 
the Ninth Amendment and against a broad construction of the granted 
powers in the Tenth Amendment. In any event, the religion clauses that 
were added to Article VI and the First Amendment, like Jefferson's later 
comments, do not indicate a climate of opinion hostile to cooperation 
between church and state so much as they reflect the lengthy, often bitter 
struggle for disestablishment that had only recently been waged in Virginia 
and was continuing in other states.  They were understood as precautions 
against a national establishment of religion—however "tolerant" it might 
be—rather than as a disavowal of the fundamentally biblical, and largely 
Christian, principles on which the constitutional system was based.  Yet the 
Supreme Court has resisted this understanding, as Mark DeWolfe Howe 
observed: 
A frank acknowledgment that, in making the wall of separation a 
constitutional barrier, the faith of Roger Williams played a more important 
part than the doubts of Jefferson probably seemed to the present Court to 
carry unhappy implications. Such an acknowledgment might suggest that 
the First Amendment was designed not merely to codify a political principle 
but to implant a somewhat special principle of theology in the 
Constitution—a principle, by no means uncontested, which asserts that a 
church dependent on governmental favor cannot be true to its better self. . . . 
It is hard for the present generation of emancipated Americans to conceive 
the possibility that the framers of the Constitution were willing to 
incorporate some theological presuppositions in the framework of federal 
government.  I find it impossible to deny that such presuppositions did find 
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their way into the Constitution.  To make that admission does not seem to 
me to necessitate the concession which others seem to think it entails—the 
concession that the government created by that Constitution can properly 
become embroiled in religious turmoil.32 
Indeed, this ‘somewhat special principle of theology’ may have involved 
not only Roger Williams' wall of separation against political corruption of 
the church but also John Cotton's hedge of protection against religious 
corruption of the Christian polity. Although the restriction of suffrage to 
church members had disappeared by then, 
similar precautions—such as the use of religious tests—were still common.  
It was only with the assurance—however unrealistic—that religious liberty 
was compatible with this principle that such restrictions were abandoned. 
IV DISESTABLISHMENT 
Religious liberty was seen by some of the founders as a means of 
strengthening Christianity through sectarian competition while still 
promoting an essentially biblical standard of law and justice.  Even the 
most latitudinarian of the founders were unwilling to disavow ethical 
standards that the Bible makes binding on all times and all nations.  A 
century or more was to pass before religious liberalism began to 
successfully challenge traditional Christianity in regard to law and 
morality. 
A Virginia 
Prior to 1776, attempts to obtain toleration for religious dissenters in 
Virginia had largely failed.  A number of Baptist preachers were beaten and 
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jailed.  James Madison was prominent among those who protested against 
these persecutions in the name of "liberty of conscience.''  Following the 
Declaration of Independence, a state convention was held to organize a 
new government and draft a constitution.  Petitions from dissenting 
churches called for freedom of worship, exemption from religious 
assessments, and disestablishment of the Church of England.  George 
Mason submitted a bill of rights that included a provision for religious 
toleration written by Patrick Henry.  Madison objected to the word 
‘toleration’ because of its implication that liberty is a matter of grace, not 
right.  He proposed that the wording be changed to guarantee "the full and 
free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience,'' although 
he added a restraining clause: "unless under color of religion the 
preservation of equal liberty and the existence of the State are manifestly 
endangered.”33 
 
It took time to work out politically the practical implications of religious 
liberty. Among the first concessions were the admission of dissenting 
chaplains to the army and the suspension of church rates.  While general 
assessments were ended in 1779, the establishment remained.  The 
following year, the validity of marriages performed by dissenting ministers 
was recognized and responsibility for overseeing the poor passed from the 
church vestries to a state office.34 
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Meanwhile, churches of all denominations were being devastated by the 
war. Numerous church building were destroyed and congregations were 
deprived of their clergy.35  In response to this situation, the legislature, 
which was still predominantly Episcopalian in its sympathies, passed an act 
to incorporate the Protestant Episcopal Church, then quickly repealed it.  
The repeal was soon followed by an act annulling all laws favoring the 
Church and dissolving its ties with the state.  But Patrick Henry sponsored 
a "Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion" 
which won the support of George Washington, Richard Henry Lee, and 
John Marshall.  It appeared close to passage when Madison motioned for a 
postponement of the final vote until the next session so that public opinion 
could be registered.  During the interim he wrote his famous "Memorial 
and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments" in which he observed: 
The same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all 
other religions, may establish with the same ease, any particular sect of 
Christians in exclusion of all other sects, and the same authority which can 
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support 
of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other 
establishment in all cases whatsoever.36 
“Establishment”, for Madison, clearly meant direct tax support for 
churches.  Madison's campaign succeeded.  The assessment bill was 
defeated the following autumn and Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing 
Religious Freedom, first introduced in 1779, was passed in January 1789.  
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The last vestige of the old establishment—the glebe lands which supported 
the clergy—did not finally pass away until 1840.37 
B Massachusetts 
Much the same pattern of disestablishment was followed in other states, 
although at a slower pace.  In Massachusetts, Isaac Backus argued for 
religious liberty as early as 1774 on the same principle of "no taxation 
without representation" that his fellow patriots used in arguing for political 
liberty, claiming that the legislators 
… [N]ever were empowered to lay any taxes but what were of a civil and 
worldly nature; and to impose religious taxes is as much out of their 
jurisdiction, as it can be for Britain to tax America. … That which has made 
the greatest noise, is a tax of three pence a pound upon tea; but your law of 
last June laid a tax of the same sum every year upon the Baptists in each 
parish, as they would expect to defend themselves against a greater one.  
And only because the Baptists in Middleboro have refused to pay that little 
tax, we hear that the first parish in said town have this fall voted to lay a 
greater tax upon us.  All America are alarmed at the tea tax; though, if they 
please, they can avoid it by not buying the tea; but we have no such liberty.  
We must either pay the little tax, or else your people appear even in this 
time of extremity, determined to lay the great one upon us.  But these lines 
are to let you know, that we are determined not to pay either of them; not 
only upon your principle of not being taxed where we are not represented, 
but also because we dare not render that homage to any earthly power, 
which I and my brethren are fully convinced belongs only to God.  We 
cannot give in the certificates you require, without implicitly allowing to 
men that authority which we believe in our consciences belongs only to 
God.  Here, therefore, we claim charter rights, liberty of conscience.  And if 
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any still deny it to us, they must answer to Him who has said, 'With what 
measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.'38 
Backus's plea to the Massachusetts legislature in December 1774 was 
unavailing, as was his earlier appeal to the Continental Congress in 
October.  Legal oppression of dissenters had long been forbidden by law 
and, although the form of an establishment remained, dissenters could 
direct their church rates to the churches of their choice.  Still, this law gave 
opportunity for harassment and was greatly resented.  Backus continued his 
campaign, first proposing a bill of rights for Massachusetts in 1783 and 
later approving the prohibition of religious tests in the U.S. Constitution.39  
But the establishment held out until 1833. 
C The Dedham Case 
Changes began with the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1820 
and the Dedham Case of 1818–1821.  An effort to dissolve the 
establishment had failed but concessions were made at the Convention.  
But it was a court ruling in favor of a political takeover of the First Church 
of Dedham that finally laid the axe to the root of the Congregationalist 
establishment.  After the pastor of the church left in 1818 to assume the 
presidency of a college, a faction of Unitarians obtained the support of a 
majority of voters in the parish to elect a recent graduate of Harvard 
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Divinity School.  The school had been Unitarian since the board of Harvard 
had been taken over in 1805. 
A majority of the church members refused to accept the new pastor and, 
after the parish—which included non-members—installed him anyway, 
complained to officials about the takeover.  A committee dominated by 
Unitarians was called to investigate and decided in favor of the parish, 
claiming that the veto power by the church majority was established in 
custom rather than law.  The Trinitarian majority then bolted the church 
and took the records, communion service, and trust deeds with them.  The 
Unitarian faction retaliated by excommunicating them for "disorderly 
walking and schism," then sued them for return of the property.  The case 
eventually went to the Massachusetts Supreme Court.  Chief Justice Isaac 
Parker, who wrote the unanimous opinion in Baker v Fales, 16 Mass 487 
(1820), was a leader of the Federalist-Unitarians.  William McLoughlin 
believes he was motivated by a belief that only a broad Erastian policy that 
allowed majority rule within the parishes could preserve the old 
establishment.  But the effect of the ruling was to put Trinitarian 
Congregationalists into the position of a dissenting minority.40 
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What struck the Trinitarian majority in Dedham even harder was the court's 
claim that once they had seceded from the parish they ceased to exist, at 
least in the eyes of the law (a view consistent with the old view that 
unincorporated religious congregations had no legal standing).  Starting 
from the assumption that "Churches as such, have no power but that . . . of 
divine worship and church order and discipline" in any parish, the court 
went on to declare "The authority of the church" is "invisible" and "as all to 
civil purposes, the secession of a whole church from the parish would be an 
extinction of the church; and it is competent of the members of the parish to 
institute a new church or to engraft one upon the old stock if any of it should 
remain; and this new church would succeed to all the rights of the old, in 
relation to the parish."  Somehow the Congregational churches had become 
nothing but the creatures of the majority of qualified voters in the parish.  
This would have shocked the founders of the Bay Colony.41 
In the end, disestablishment in Massachusetts came about, as it did in 
Virginia half a century earlier, because of the intrusion of public policy 
considerations into church affairs to a degree that even offended many 
members of the establishment itself.  The Standing Orders of 
Massachusetts were suspended by constitutional amendment in 1833.  E. R. 
Norman concluded: 
Even this victory would not have been so easily accomplished had not many 
of the Congregational meeting-houses passed into the hands of Unitarian 
pastors and so offended orthodox Trinitarians that they would rather have 
the churches disestablished than countenance the propagation of error out of 
public funds.42 
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The establishment principle was not yet dead in Massachusetts, however: 
only dormant. Four years later the Unitarian-dominated legislature, led by 
Senate president Horace Mann, established a state Board of Education 
along the lines of the Prussian state school system.  Mann then resigned 
from the legislature and became the Board's first secretary in order to 
promote, to use his own words, "faith in the improvability of the race,-- in 
their accelerating improvability."43  In his study of the origins of the early 
American public school movement, Samuel Blumenfeld comments: 
If the American public school movement took on the tone of a religious 
crusade after Mann became Secretary of the Board of Education, it was 
because Mann himself saw it as a religious mission.  He accepted the 
position of Secretary not only because of what it would demand of him, but 
because it would help fulfill the spiritual hopes of his friends.  They had 
faith that Mann could deliver the secular miracle that would vindicate their 
view of human nature and justify their repudiation of Calvinism.44 
This new establishment was by far a more subtle one but still noticeably 
religious in character.  It came complete with a system of secular 
seminaries called normal schools and was later reinforced by compulsory 
attendance laws.  The expressly "non-sectarian" religious purpose of the 
schools helps account for the opposition from many orthodox pastors and 
school masters as well as the controversy among various religious 
traditions—both pro and con—it generated throughout the remainder of the 
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century.45  If the practice of intruding politics into religion was simply a 
matter of habit, it was certainly proving to be a difficult one to break. 
V INFLUENCE OF BIBLICAL THEISM 
In a manner of speaking, the habit of intruding politics into religion—or 
religion into politics—is not only a difficult one to break but impossible.  A 
religiously or politically neutral—or purely objective—standard of law and 
government is as unimaginable as it is impracticable.  This is not to say 
that, by itself, any particular system of belief legally qualifies as a religion 
or even plays the role of one.  For example, the Supreme Court has 
wrestled for years with the problem of defining religion so as to include 
some non-theistic systems of belief while not wishing at the same time to 
give credence to every pretense, prejudice, or preference that calls itself a 
religion.  The Court conceives religion at once too broadly and too 
narrowly.  The point is that any belief assumes a complete cultural or 
ideological ensemble of which it is only one artefact.  It is this ensemble 
that represents the kind of ''ultimate concern" that Paul Tillich identified as 
religious.  "Every law order is an establishment of religion," as R. J. 
Rushdoony repeatedly emphasizes.46  "The point is this: all law is enacted 
morality and presupposes a moral system, a moral law, and all morality 
presupposes a religion as its foundation."47 
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The maintenance of some kind of standard is unavoidable.  Religion is not 
the end of all rational inquiry—the convenient deus ex machina designed to 
squelch further argument by appealing to a higher court—but the beginning 
of it.  One religious viewpoint or another will set the terms of debate.  Greg 
Bahnsen believes, for example, that the epistemologically self-conscious 
Christian—what Bahnsen here refers to as a "presuppositionalist"—"must 
challenge the would-be autonomous man with the fact that only upon the 
presupposition of God and His revelation can intelligibility be preserved in 
his effort to understand and interpret the world.''48  Accordingly, the effort 
to understand and interpret the world is fundamentally religious.  The 
practical consequence is simply this: any system of law or morality will 
tend to either reinforce or contradict a given religion.  In America, the 
religion in question is predominantly Christian. 
 
Assuming that law is an establishment of religion, it is proper to ask: what 
set of religious presuppositions is embodied in the Constitution or--even 
more fundamentally--in western culture?  M. Stanton Evans restates what is 
often obvious only to outside observers and adherents of other religions: it 
is biblical theism that underlies the constitutional tradition. 
Even on a brief recapitulation, it should be evident that we have derived a 
host of political and social values from our religious heritage: Personal 
freedom and individualism, limited government-constitutionalism and the 
order-keeping state, the balance and division of powers, separation of 
church and state, federalism and local autonomy, government by consent 
and representative institutions, bills of rights and privileges.  Add to these 
the development of Western science, the notion of progress over linear time, 
egalitarianism and the like, and it is apparent that the array of ideas and 
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attitudes that we think of as characteristically secular and liberal are actually 
by-products of our religion.  It may be said, indeed, that the characteristic 
feature of liberalism, broadly defined—classical as well as modern—has 
been an attempt to take these by-products, sever them from their theological 
origins, and make them independent and self-validating. On the whole, it 
has not been a successful experiment.49 
Biblical theism desacralizes—or secularizes---the natural order.  Some 
religions begin with a multitude of fickle deities that man must propitiate or 
attempt to control through iconic or symbolic magic.  The Bible begins 
with one transcendent God who creates the world and places man within it 
as his steward.  Liberty is possible because all creation is governed by 
God's law.  Otherwise, there is no security short of total control and politics 
becomes a matter of conquest rather than consensus. 
While the assumptions behind American constitutional law are secular in 
their expression, many—if not most—of their guiding principles are 
derived primarily or secondarily from biblical religion.   The absence of an 
express statement of religious purpose or even an acknowledgment of 
divine blessings has been the subject of controversy over whether the 
Constitution is a "secular" or "godless" document.50  While the religious 
references it does contain are too oblique to satisfy critics who lament its 
"political atheism,"51 other critics are equally offended by any expression of 
public religiosity, regarding it as "religious treason" or as "an establishment 
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of religion."52  But the earlier colonial charters and state constitutions were 
similarly guided by practical considerations and were likewise sparing in 
their religious references.  The customary invocation of divine favor or 
acknowledgment of God's blessings, usually found in the preambles of state 
constitutions, is generally a later development inspired by the New England 
covenants.   
But the argument from silence is not a very satisfactory approach to the 
question. The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution are also silent 
about the question of sovereignty.53  The issues which prompted the calling 
of the Philadelphia Convention related to the strengthening of an already 
existing "perpetual Union" rather than the creation of an altogether new 
political system.  The assumption that the founders radically departed from 
earlier principles and precedents is unnecessary, particularly considering 
the attention they paid to the rule of law and the limitation of power.  It is 
more logical to assume a continuity of purpose. 
With the exception of an incidental mention of religion and a brief 
reference to "the Great Governor of the world," the Articles were similarly 
silent on the subject of religion.  Yet the retention by the states of "every 
power, jurisdiction and right" not "expressly delegated to the United States" 
did not prevent Congress from exercising its customary religious functions.  
Congress issued proclamations of fast days and thanksgivings.  It employed 
chaplains, directed the importation of Bibles from Europe in 1777, and 
endorsed the publication of the first American edition of the Bible in 
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1782.54  If, as Leo Pfeffer maintains, the political leaders of this period 
worked from an assumed consensus of opinion in support of Christianity, 
there is little reason to suppose this assumption suddenly changed in 1787.  
In fact, Robert Cord has challenged Pfeffer's separationist hypothesis 
regarding the religion clauses of the Constitution, claiming that the facts 
"prove beyond reasonable doubt that no 'high and impregnable' wall 
between Church and State was in historical fact erected by the First 
Amendment nor was one intended by the Framers of that Amendment."55  
Cord notes that the new Congress continued to employ chaplains and even 
provided direct aid to religion, sometimes in fulfilment of treaty 
obligations.  The first four Presidents except Jefferson proclaimed days of 
public thanksgiving and prayer.  Sunday continued to be observed as a day 
of rest.56 
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VI A RELEASE OF ENERGY57 
The historian Richard Cornuelle maintains that a spirit of cooperation and 
local self-government grew among the early colonists out of "an unusual 
sense of interdependence, powerfully reinforced by the terrors of the 
Atlantic crossing." 58   These early Americans pioneered "the 
democratization of community service."  Immigrants would establish 
voluntary associations—with names like the Scots Charitable Society 
(1657) in Boston and the Norden Aid Society in Hudson, Wisconsin—to 
help them adjust to life in America. 
Although the motives for reform during this period varied, they generally 
fell into two broad categories:  expressly Christian evangelism and 
missionary work, and broadly non-sectarian humanitarian programs. 59  
These motives operated side by side and were often almost 
indistinguishable.  With a few exceptions, what they shared was a strong 
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emphasis on voluntary cooperation through private benevolent 
associations, as opposed to relying on direct government intervention. 
The objects of all this moral energy ranged from poor relief to legal reform 
to preservation of the Sabbath to the salvation of seamen to vegetarianism 
and the water cure, including temperance (“jumping on the bandwagon” 
and “falling off the wagon”), the peace movement, the abolition of dueling, 
public education, prison reform, various communal experiments, asylums 
for the handicapped, health fads, feminism, the abolitionist movement, and 
the literary movement that in many respects embodied or embraced so 
many of them:  Transcendentalism.60   
It was the proliferation of such voluntary associations that so impressed 
Alexis de Tocqueville on his visit to America in 1831.  But Eugen 
Rosenstock-Huessy had an even larger view of the critical importance of 
what he called the “freedom of endowment,” which provides a practical 
foundation and expression for freedom of conscience:  
The Truce of God, the free choice of a profession, the liberty to make a will, 
the copyright of ideas—these institutions are like letters in the alphabet 
which we call Western civilization. … They have emancipated the various 
elements of our social existence from previous bondage.  Each time one of 
these institutions came into being, it had a stiffening effect on one type of 
human activity.  Each time it enabled man to direct his energies towards 
ends that hitherto transcended his potentialities.  Less and less did he remain 
bound by the unchangeable traditions of his environment.  A police force 
means nothing less than the emancipation of the civilian within myself; for 
without it, I should be forced to cultivate the rugged virtues of a vigilant 
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man.  To free the courts from the whims of a changing government exalts 
my will and testament to a kind of immortality: something will endure when 
I have passed away.  And so each of these institutions was hailed as a 
deliverance.  Not one of them came into existence without the shedding of 
streams of blood.  Each of these institutions was accorded the greatest 
sacrifices.  The paradoxical truth about progress, then, is that it wholly 
depends on the survival of massive institutions which prevent a relapse from 
a stage which has once been reached.61 
By the time Rosenstock-Huessy wrote in 1938, however, these institutions 
and the liberties they upheld had been put at risk.  Due to poor stewardship, 
they are still at risk today.  To drive his point home, Rosenstock-Huessy 
cited Daniel Webster’s successful argument before the U.S. Supreme Court 
on behalf of Dartmouth College, which had been chartered by the Crown, 
against a takeover by the State of New Hampshire.62  Webster famously 
concluded his argument: “It is, Sir, as I have said, a small college.  And yet 
there are those who love it.”  
VII CONCLUSION 
The American experiment in ordered liberty shows that nothing should be 
considered so small as to fall below constitutional notice or protection.  As 
Webster himself put it in a speech, “The Spirit of Liberty:” 
The spirit of liberty is, indeed, a bold and fearless spirit; but it is also a 
sharp-sighted spirit; it is jealous of encroachment, jealous of power, jealous 
of man.  It demands checks; it seeks for guards; it insists on securities; it 
entrenches itself behind strong defences, and fortifies itself with all possible 
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care against the assaults of ambition and passion.  It does not trust the 
amiable weaknesses of human nature, and therefore it will not permit power 
to overstep its prescribed limits, though benevolence, good intent, and 
patriotic purpose come along with it.  Neither does it satisfy itself with 
flashy and temporary resistance to its legal authority.  Far otherwise.  It 
seeks for duration and permanence.  It looks before and after; and, building 
on the experience of ages which are past, it labors diligently for the benefit 
of ages to come.  This is the nature of constitutional liberty; and this is our 
liberty, if we will rightly understand and preserve it.63 
Webster’s “Spirit of Liberty” reflects an understanding that both enabled 
and accompanied the rise of religious liberty in America.  Many of the 
early commentators on the voluntary principle in religion took pains to 
emphasize that no slight to religion was intended by dissolving the state 
religious establishments.  The idea of loosening churches from dependence 
on the state treasury was as novel as the penitentiary system that drew 
interested European visitors like Alexis de Tocqueville, and it drew similar 
wonderment and comment.  Francis Grund, who emigrated to America 
from Bohemia, wrote that  
Americans look upon religion as a promoter of civil and political liberty; 
and have, therefore, transferred to it a large portion of the affection which 
they cherish from the institutions of their country.  In other countries, where 
religion has become the instrument of oppression, it has been the policy of 
the liberal party to diminish its influence; but in America its promotion is 
essential to the Constitution.64 
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If the institutional separation of church and state had developed purely for 
reasons of state, the character of the American religious tradition might 
have followed a very different line of development.65  For example, the 
disestablishment of the Roman Catholic Church in France, when it finally 
came during the French Revolution, was accompanied by violent 
anticlericalism and was followed by the creation of a highly syncretistic 
civil religion. Although there were strong fears of similar Jacobin violence 
in America during this period, the disestablishment of churches proceeded 
rather peacefully.  The immediate effect of disestablishment, as Lyman 
Beecher and others saw it, was to strengthen the character and prestige of 
the churches themselves.66 
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